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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

ORACLE AMERICA, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOOGLE INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:10-cv-03561-WHA

**GOOGLE'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN  
 SUPPORT OF MOTION *IN LIMINE* NO. 3  
 TO EXCLUDE PORTIONS OF  
 COCKBURN REPORT ON DAMAGES**

Judge: Hon. William Alsup

Date Comp. Filed: October 27, 2010

Trial Date: October 31, 2011

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## I. INTRODUCTION

As the Court directed in its September 27, 2011 order, Google submits this supplemental brief in support of its pending motion *in limine* to strike portions of the opinions that Oracle's damages expert Dr. Iain Cockburn seeks to offer, based on Dr. Cockburn's October 10, 2011 reply reports and his testimony at his October 17, 2011 deposition.

The defects with Dr. Cockburn's analysis are even clearer in light of his reply reports and deposition. *First*, his reasonable royalty analysis, both as to Oracle's patent and copyright claims, depends on his opinion that the patents-in-suit are worth 30% and the copyrights worth 15% of the value of the proposed Sun-Google partnership in 2006. Dr. Cockburn concedes that the partnership would have given Google many other items of great value—thousands of patents, numerous copyrights including source code, the JAVA trademark, and other technical know-how—but he has never made any effort to value any other component of the partnership and admits he couldn't do so if he had to. Having no sense of the whole, he has no basis to opine on the value of any of the parts. *Second*, Dr. Cockburn confirmed that his upward adjustment of his baseline patent royalty tacks on Sun's projected lost profits (which is legal error) and is based on a single, speculative internal Sun projection (which is not a sufficient factual basis for any opinion). *Third*, Dr. Cockburn conceded Oracle cannot seek a hypothetical copyright license, because Sun never would have licensed Google to use Sun's copyrighted material in the manner Sun alleges it has done here—to develop a purportedly competing, incompatible version of Sun's Java platform. *Fourth*, Dr. Cockburn has ignored the Court's directive to calculate separate damage amounts for the various patent claims or copyrighted materials. That makes his opinion useless to a jury that may find liability on some claims but not others. His revised analysis still is generalized, cursory, and geared only to putting the largest possible number before the jury.

Oracle devoted most of its opposition to Google's motion to erecting strawmen, working to justify positions taken by Dr. Cockburn that, although they are wrong, were not the bases of Google's *Daubert* motion—such as Dr. Cockburn's insistence on using Sun's opening negotiating bid of \$100 million as his baseline, rather than Sun's subsequent offer of \$28 million. But none of Oracle's responses to Google's *actual* challenges has any merit.

## II. ARGUMENT

**A. The Court should strike Dr. Cockburn's entire reasonable royalty analysis, because he admittedly has no information about the rights Google would have received under the proposed Sun-Google partnership, which is the basis of his calculation.**

The foundation of Dr. Cockburn's reasonable royalty analysis—as to both the patents-in-suit and the asserted copyrights—is the 2006 negotiations between Sun and Google for a


Declaration of Daniel Purcell in Support of Google's Supplemental Brief ("Purcell Decl.") Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 77:20-78:3. Dr. Cockburn wrongly uses Sun's opening demand in February 2006 of about \$100 million as his baseline, ignoring the parties' real-world negotiations over the following two months that, before negotiations broke down at the end of April, resulted in a final offer from Sun of \$28 million. After setting the \$100 million baseline, he assigns 30% of that total amount to the six patents-in-suit and a further 15% to the copyrights.

But for purposes of this motion, the problem is much more fundamental than whether the right starting point is \$100 million, \$28 million, or something else. Dr. Cockburn admits Google would have received many other things in exchange for that money beside the patents and copyrights at issue here—including a full license to thousands of Sun patents, the right to use numerous Sun copyrights (including Sun's copyrighted source code to its Java ME platform), the ability to stamp its products with Sun's JAVA trademark, and access to Sun's engineers and their many years of expertise in developing Java-based technologies. But Dr. Cockburn admits he has no specific information about anything Google would have received under the partnership other than the patents and copyrights at issue, and has made no attempt to value any of those other components. Because he has no sense of those other components or their values, he cannot "identify a reliable factual basis" for calculating the percentage of the whole attributable to the patents and copyrights. *Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp.*, Civ. No. 99-1035 RHK/FLN, 2002 WL 34447587, \*12 (D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2002); *see also id.* at \*11 (striking an expert's opinion that two patents-in-suit "accounted for virtually all of the \$25 million" paid for a license to an intellectual property portfolio, despite the fact that he never "tried to determine the value to [the licensee] of any of the items in that portfolio other than the patents-in-suit").

1 Dr. Cockburn admitted each of these methodological failures in his deposition. *First*, he  
2 admitted that Google would have received, among other things, a broad intellectual property  
3 license in exchange for his \$100 million starting point:



4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9 Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 78:4-13. But Dr. Cockburn conceded he knew nothing  
10 about the Sun patents in the portfolio—how many there were, what they covered, or their  
11 potential value either to Sun or Google.



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14  
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20  
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22  
23 *Id.* at 78:14-23, 78:25-79:9.

24  
25 *Second*, Dr. Cockburn's answer was the same regarding the Sun copyrighted material that  
26 Google would have been permitted to use under the contemplated partnership. He understood  
27 Google would have received a broad copyright license, including to source code, but hadn't  
28 made any efforts to understand the scope of the copyrighted material or calculate its value.




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14  
15 Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 79:14-80:13, 80:15. Dr. Cockburn specifically conceded  
16 that access to Sun's proprietary, copyrighted source code may have had substantial economic  
17 value to Google. *Id.* at 80:16-18, 80:20-22.

18 *Third*, Dr. Cockburn likewise knew that a contemplated partnership with Sun would have  
19 given Google rights to use Sun trademarks, including the JAVA mark—but again, he made no  
20 effort to understand the scope of the rights on the table or calculate the value of those rights.

21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26 Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 81:21-82:5.

27 *Fourth*, Dr. Cockburn admitted that his baseline—the never-consummated deal between  
28 Sun and Google—would have delivered additional value to Google beyond just an intellectual

1 property license. Yet once again, he admitted that he did not fully understand what else Google  
2 would have gotten, and had not tried to value any non-license benefits or otherwise taken those  
3 benefits into account in his analysis.



15 Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 84:7-85:5.

16 The bottom line is Dr. Cockburn simply has no idea what is included in his \$100 million  
17 starting point. Despite knowing that his starting point included myriad items of value, he made  
18 no attempt to identify or account for any of those items. Having no knowledge of the whole, he  
19 lacks any logical or legal basis for calculating the value of any of the parts.

20 Oracle undoubtedly will protest that, unlike the expert in *Medtronic*, whose valuation of  
21 the patents in that case was based on “a gut feeling,” *Medtronic*, 2002 WL 34447587, \*7-\*8, Dr.  
22 Cockburn purports to support his 30% valuation of the patents-in-suit and 15% apportionment of  
23 the copyrights with three performance-based studies. Google explained in detail in its trial brief  
24 why each of those studies is rigged and unreliable. Google Trial Br. [Dkt. No. 534] at 18-19.<sup>1</sup>

25  
26 <sup>1</sup> Briefly, Oracle’s employee-conducted, made-for-litigation benchmarking studies disabled far  
27 more than just the allegedly infringing functionality, leading to massive overstatement of the  
28 importance of that functionality to the performance of the Android software. Cockburn’s own  
econometric study of second-hand eBay smartphone purchases evaluated an entirely different  
product market and ignores basic econometric concepts by failing to control for variable bias.  
And Oracle’s commissioned consumer-preference study tested a cherry-picked list of



1 But for purposes of this motion, and the logic of *Medtronic*, the studies make no difference. The  
 2 studies purport to measure only the relevance of the allegedly patented and copyrighted features  
 3 to device performance and consumer preferences. They have nothing to say about any of the  
 4 other benefits that would have been conferred by the other aspects of a Sun-Google partnership.  
 5 They do not address the value of the other Sun patents, Sun's proprietary and copyrighted source  
 6 code, the Java trademark, or access to Sun engineers and their Java ME experience. They are not  
 7 logical substitutes for the critical questions that Dr. Cockburn has failed even to ask.

8 With no means for calculating the percentage of his \$100 million starting point that ought  
 9 to be attributed to the patents and copyrights, Dr. Cockburn's entire reasonable royalty analysis,  
 10 as to both the patents and copyrights, falls apart. Accordingly, this Court should exclude Dr.  
 11 Cockburn's opinion as to the proper amount of a reasonable patent or copyright royalty.

12 **B. The Court should strike Dr. Cockburn's upward adjustments to his patent-damages**  
 13 **calculation, because Dr. Cockburn admits it is a proxy for Oracle's lost profits and**  
 14 **that it lacks a reasonable factual foundation.**

15 This Court should strike Dr. Cockburn's upward adjustment of Oracle's purported patent  
 16 infringement royalty from \$29.6 million (30% of his \$100 million starting point) to \$176  
 17 million<sup>2</sup> for two reasons. First, it violated basic legal rules governing patent damages by  
 18 smuggling Sun's purported lost profits into what is concededly a reasonable royalty calculation.  
 19 Second, it lacked any reasonable factual foundation, because it was based on a single,  
 20 speculative, internal Sun projection of revenue for a business line that did not exist. Dr.  
 21 Cockburn did nothing to verify the foundation of the Sun projection, to the extent it had any. At  
 22 his deposition, Dr. Cockburn admitted all of this.

23 *First*, Dr. Cockburn admitted the sole source of his nearly six-fold upward adjustment of  
 24 patent damages is profits Sun allegedly lost the chance to earn because Google deployed the

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25 smartphone features without first bothering to establish those features' importance to consumers,  
 26 or whether there were other, more important features that also should be included—then simply  
 27 assumed a one-to-one relationship between the relative importance of the tested features to one  
 28 another and Android's market share. Google will show at trial that none of this is science.

<sup>2</sup> Dr. Cockburn's original report asserted an upward adjustment to \$201.8 million, Oracle Opp'n  
 at 3 (citing Cockburn Report ¶ 47), but in his reply to the report of Google expert Dr. Gregory  
 Leonard, he has revised the amount of patent damages downward to \$176 million. Purcell  
 Decl.") Ex. B (Cockburn Reply to Leonard) at Ex. 6.

1 Android platform. This is improper as a matter of law. There is a well-understood standard for  
 2 seeking lost profits on a patent infringement claim, first adopted by the Sixth Circuit in *Panduit*  
 3 *Corp. v. Stahl Bros. Fibre Works, Inc.*, 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978), and adopted by the  
 4 Federal Circuit thereafter. *See, e.g., Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc.*, 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed.  
 5 Cir. 1995) (citing *Panduit*, 575 F.2d at 1156) (noting that the Federal Circuit follows *Panduit*,  
 6 which “requires that a patentee establish: (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence of  
 7 acceptable non-infringing substitutes; (3) manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the  
 8 demand; and (4) the amount of the profit it would have made.”). Oracle hasn’t pleaded a lost-  
 9 profits claim here. Even if it had, Dr. Cockburn makes no attempt to address, much less satisfy,  
 10 the four-part *Panduit* test. He admittedly calculates only a reasonable royalty. Although a  
 11 patentee’s likely lost profits is one factor that can be used to justify a reasonable royalty  
 12 calculation, *see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp.*, 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120  
 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), Oracle may not simply boost the baseline royalty upward by the amount of its  
 14 purported lost profits. Permitting that would make the *Panduit* requirements meaningless.

15 There can be no dispute that Dr. Cockburn increased his estimated reasonable royalty by  
 16 the amount of Sun’s purported lost profits. At deposition, Dr. Cockburn testified that, in  
 17 adjusting his patent royalty upward from \$29.6 million to \$176 million, [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED] Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 136:4-12. Dr. Cockburn  
 20 admitted at deposition that he was unable to quantify the effect of either the litigation premium  
 21 or fragmentation.<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at 136:13-16, 137:20-138:16.

22  
 23 <sup>3</sup> The vagueness of Dr. Cockburn’s opinions regarding “fragmentation” deserves close attention,  
 24 particularly given Oracle’s stated intention to use “fragmentation” to seek extraordinary  
 25 injunctive relief effectively turning over the entire Android platform to Oracle. When asked how  
 26 one could know whether fragmentation had caused economic harm to Oracle, Dr. Cockburn gave  
 no indication that Oracle had any way of proving such harm at trial, other than through its usual  
 alarmist rhetoric. [REDACTED]

27 [REDACTED] Purcell Decl.  
 Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 139:5-18 (emphasis added). The only actual data Dr. Cockburn relied  
 28 on to support his claim that fragmentation had harmed Oracle had nothing to do with Oracle  
 financials—it was a calculation showing that Java developer message boards have recently been  
 less active, in terms of new threads started, than Android developer message boards. *Id.* at

1 Accordingly, Dr. Cockburn's [REDACTED]  
 2 [REDACTED] *Id.*  
 3 at 176:12-16. But his method for calculating [REDACTED] was  
 4 simply to add the amount Sun projected it would earn in profits from a partnership with Google.  
 5 Dr. Cockburn admitted that the only basis for the bulk of his upward adjustment was a single

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED]  
 9 [REDACTED]  
 10 [REDACTED]  
 11 [REDACTED]

12 143:6-16 [REDACTED]  
 13 [REDACTED] Finally, when  
 14 directly asked to identify specific evidence of harm to Oracle as a result of fragmentation, Dr.  
 Cockburn had nothing to offer beyond Oracle's own *ipse dixit*.

15 [REDACTED]  
 16 [REDACTED]  
 17 [REDACTED]  
 18 [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED]  
 20 [REDACTED]  
 21 [REDACTED]  
 22 [REDACTED]

23 *Id.* at 156:18-157-10.

24 <sup>4</sup> In his original report, Dr. Cockburn explained that, of the total \$175.6 million upward royalty  
 25 adjustment, \$167.2 million (approximately 95.2% of the total adjustment) was based on Sun's  
 26 lost profits, while a further \$8.4 million (the remaining 4.8% of the adjustment) was based on the  
 27 removal of the revenue-sharing cap. Oracle Opp'n at 3 (table) (citing Cockburn Report ¶ 47).  
 28 In his reply report, Dr. Cockburn reduces the upward adjustment to \$146.4 million. Purcell Decl.  
 Ex. B (Cockburn Reply to Leonard) at Ex. 6 (giving total patent damages figure of \$176 million,  
 which is \$146.4 million more than his \$29.6 starting point). Dr. Cockburn no longer explains  
 what portion of his revised upward adjustment is attributable to lost profits, but applying the  
 same percentages as in his previous report, 95.2% of \$146.4 million calculates to about \$139.37  
 million in alleged lost profits tacked onto Dr. Cockburn's current royalty calculation.

1 [REDACTED]  
 2 [REDACTED]  
 3 [REDACTED]  
 4 Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 177:6-20.

5 [REDACTED]  
 6 [REDACTED] Purcell Decl. Ex. C

7 [REDACTED] And Dr. Cockburn admitted [REDACTED]  
 8 [REDACTED]  
 9 [REDACTED] Cockburn

10 Report ¶ 39 (emphasis added). That is lost profits, plain and simple. Cockburn confirmed at  
 11 deposition that he [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED] Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 194:1-8. It does not  
 13 matter by what name Dr. Cockburn calls this adjustment; it is a straight importation of lost  
 14 profits. That is barred by *Panduit*.

15 Oracle offers (and could offer) nothing in its opposition to Google's motion *in limine* to  
 16 rehabilitate Dr. Cockburn's analysis. It claims Dr. Cockburn has just used Sun's lost profits as  
 17 one of the *Georgia-Pacific* factors, but that is plainly wrong. Dr. Cockburn did not weigh the  
 18 projected lost profits against other factors and conclude that, because Sun might have made  
 19 profits from a partnership with Google, there should be upward pressure on the royalty; **he**  
 20 **increased the royalty by the amount of purported lost profits**. Although Oracle argues that Dr.  
 21 Cockburn also found other *Georgia-Pacific* factors would support an increase in his \$29.6  
 22 million baseline, it cannot (and does not) argue that Dr. Cockburn used any of those factors as a  
 23 basis for quantifying his upward adjustment. The sole basis of that quantification remains Sun's  
 24 alleged lost profits. That is disqualifying legal error under *Daubert*.

25 *Second*, even apart from that legal error, Cockburn's patent royalty adjustment should be  
 26 stricken because he lacks a reasonable factual basis for it. As just discussed, his only basis for  
 27 quantifying at least \$139.37 million of that adjustment is the Project Armstrong presentation.  
 28 That document, created in late February or early March 2006, offers a tentative projection of

1 revenues Sun might have made, had it partnered with Google. Not only are there no underlying  
 2 financial data backing up the financial projections in the presentation, the author of the  
 3 presentation, in her cover email [REDACTED]  
 4 [REDACTED]  
 5 [REDACTED] Purcell Decl. Ex. D (Knopoff  
 6 email) at OAGOOOGLE0100166873 (emphases added).

7 Cockburn made several critical concessions at his deposition confirming how speculative  
 8 this single presentation truly was [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]  
 10 [REDACTED]  
 11 [REDACTED]  
 12 [REDACTED]  
 13 [REDACTED]  
 14 [REDACTED]  
 15 [REDACTED]  
 16 [REDACTED]  
 17 [REDACTED]  
 18 [REDACTED]  
 19 [REDACTED]

20 *Daubert* makes clear that, to be admissible, expert testimony must “connote[ ] more than  
 21 subjective belief or unsupported speculation.” *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.*, 509 U.S.  
 22 579, 590 (1993). The single Project Armstrong projection essentially defines “subjective belief  
 23 and unsupported speculation.” Courts regularly exclude expert testimony based on unverified  
 24 revenue projections, particularly a litigant’s self-serving, internal projections. *See, e.g., Zenith*  
 25 *Elecs. Corp. v. WH-TV Broad. Corp.*, 395 F.3d 416, 420 (7th Cir. 2005) (rejecting as basis for  
 26 damages claim a party’s “internal projections, which rest on its say-so rather than statistical  
 27 analysis” and “represent hopes rather than the results of scientific analysis”); *TK-7 Corp. v.*  
 28 *Estate of Barbouti*, 993 F.2d 722, 732-33 (10th Cir. 1993) (rejecting damages expert opinion that



1 “failed to demonstrate any basis for concluding that another individual’s opinion on a subjective  
 2 financial prediction was reliable”); *ID Sec. Sys. Canada, Inc. v. Checkpoint Sys., Inc.*, 249 F.  
 3 Supp. 2d 622, 695 (E.D. Pa. 2003), *amended*, 268 F. Supp. 2d 448 (rejecting damages expert’s  
 4 reliance on projection by plaintiff, who had incentive to inflate predicted financial success). And  
 5 it is a basic principle of damages law that recovery of purported lost profits for new, unproven  
 6 lines of business—like the development of a full stack would have been for Sun—is disfavored.  
 7 *See TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co.*, 491 F.3d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 2007) (“as a general  
 8 rule, expected profits of a new commercial business are considered too uncertain, specific and  
 9 remote to permit recovery”); *Trademark Research Corp. v. Maxwell Online, Inc.*, 995 F.2d 326,  
 10 332 (2d Cir. 1993) (where new business seeks lost profits, “a stricter standard is imposed for the  
 11 obvious reason that there does not exist a reasonable basis of experience upon which to estimate  
 12 lost profits with the requisite degree of reasonable certainty.”).

13 Even if it were legally permissible for Oracle to recover lost profits through a reasonable  
 14 royalty (and it is not), Sun’s revenue projections are not a reasonable basis for any expert  
 15 opinion. Because Dr. Cockburn relies on nothing else, his opinion is inadmissible.

16 **C. The Court should strike Dr. Cockburn’s opinion regarding the value of a lost**  
 17 **copyright license with Google, because it ignores the governing legal standard and**  
 18 **has no factual basis.**

19 As Google previously argued, this Court should strike Cockburn’s opinion regarding the  
 20 value of a fair-market copyright license between Sun and Google for two reasons: his opinion  
 21 ignores the legal standard for calculating the value of such a license and it has no basis in the  
 22 record. In his reply report, Cockburn revised downward his estimated copyright-license amount  
 23 from \$102.6 million to [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Purcell Decl. Ex. E (Cockburn Reply to Cox) ¶ 80.

24 *First*, as the Ninth Circuit has made clear, “where the infringer could have bargained with  
 25 the copyright owner to purchase the right to use the work,” a hypothetical license measurement  
 26 looks at “what a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay to a willing seller for  
 27 plaintiff’s work.” *Jarvis v. K2, Inc.*, 486 F.3d 526, 533 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting *Sid & Marty*  
 28 *Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.*, 562 F.2d 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 1977)). To



1 prove its entitlement to hypothetical-license damages, a plaintiff is “required to show that, but for  
 2 infringement, *the parties would have agreed to license the use of the copyrighted works at*  
 3 *issue.*” *Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP AG*, No. C07-1658 PJH, 2011 WL 3862074, at \*7 (N.D. Cal.  
 4 Sept. 1, 2011) (emphasis added) (citing *Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp.*, 384 F.3d 700,  
 5 711 (9th Cir. 2004)). Critically, in this case, where Google did in fact bargain with Sun over a  
 6 license, the hypothetical license for “the use of the copyrighted works at issue” means a license  
 7 for Google to use Oracle’s copyrighted material *as it allegedly did*, by incorporating that material  
 8 into a competing product in a manner that is incompatible with Java platform standards.

9 Oracle cannot satisfy this test here, because Dr. Cockburn cites no evidence (and no such  
 10 evidence exists) that Oracle ever would have granted a license to a competitor for an allegedly  
 11 incompatible implementation of Java. Determining the price of a hypothetical copyright license  
 12 is an “objective, not a subjective” analysis, and courts must reject “[e]xcessively speculative”  
 13 claims. *See Jarvis*, 486 F.3d at 534; *Polar Bear*, 384 F.3d at 709; *Mackie v. Rieser*, 296 F.3d  
 14 909, 917 (9th Cir. 2002). Where it is clear the parties “would never have agreed to a license” in  
 15 the real world, there is no basis for awarding actual damages based on the value of a hypothetical  
 16 license. *Oracle*, 2011 WL 3862074, at \*7.

17 During his deposition, Dr. Cockburn admitted that, during their real-world negotiations in  
 18 2006, neither Sun nor Google ever raised the possibility of licensing an incompatible  
 19 implementation of Java, much less agreed to it. Dr. Cockburn also conceded, as he had to, that  
 20 he was unaware of any instance where Sun had *ever* licensed an incompatible implementation of  
 21 Java to a competitor, as Oracle is contending Google to be in this case.



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12 Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at 237:24-238:1, 238:3-18, 240:2-5 & 7-12. That ends the  
13 Court's inquiry. Sun never would have granted the hypothetical license at issue here.

14 In its opposition, Oracle argues around this issue, pointing out that a subsequent opinion  
15 in the *Oracle v. SAP* case clarified that it is not necessarily the case, as a matter of law, that a  
16 plaintiff must present evidence of "actual licenses it entered into or would have entered into for  
17 the infringed works, and/or actual 'benchmark' licenses entered into by any party for comparable  
18 use of the infringed or comparable works." Oracle Opp'n at 8-9 (citing *Oracle USA, Inc. v. SAP*  
19 *AG*, No. C07-1658 PJH, at Dkt. 1088). This changes nothing. Oracle concededly has no  
20 evidence of comparable licenses, but the broader point is that it has no evidence *of any kind* that  
21 it ever would have granted Google the hypothetical license Cockburn envisions.

22 As the *Oracle* court also explained—and Oracle does not dispute here—the Ninth Circuit  
23 "has never upheld a hypothetical license award" without "actual proof that the plaintiff would  
24 have licensed the infringed work to the defendant or a third party for the specific use at issue and  
25 proof that the infringement caused the loss of that opportunity." *Oracle*, 2011 WL 3862074, at  
26 \*8 (citing *Polar Bear*, 384 F.3d at 704, 709; *Jarvis*, 486 F.3d at 528, 533-34; *Mackie*, 296 F.3d at  
27 913, 917; *Cream Records, Inc. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.*, 754 F.2d 826, 827-28 (9th Cir.  
28 1985)). Neither has the Ninth Circuit ever affirmed hypothetical-license damages in a case

1 involving competitors (who do not commonly license each other), as opposed to partners. *See id.*  
 2 at \*8 & n.2. There is no reason for this Court to do what the Ninth Circuit has never done.

3 Oracle also characterizes Google's argument as "baffling" because "Sun *did in fact* offer  
 4 Google a license." Oracle Opp'n at 9 (emphasis in original). Oracle misunderstands Google's  
 5 argument. Oracle must concede that Sun offered to license Google a platform that would have  
 6 been fully compatible with Sun's Java standards and jointly controlled by Sun. That is 180  
 7 degrees from the hypothetical license here—an allegedly incompatible Java implementation that  
 8 is fully controlled by Google. Sun never negotiated for that, and never would have done so.

9 *Second*, Dr. Cockburn's calculation of the hypothetical copyright license is inadmissible  
 10 because it has no factual foundation. Like Dr. Cockburn's patent royalty adjustment, it relies  
 11 only on the same speculative Sun projection of Project Armstrong revenue. Purcell Decl. Ex. C  
 12 (Project Armstrong projection).<sup>5</sup> Dr. Cockburn cannot reasonably base any upward adjustment  
 13 on the Project Armstrong projection, for the reasons discussed above.

14 **D. Dr. Cockburn's opinion fails to separate out patent damages on a claim by claim**  
 15 **basis or copyright damages among the different categories of allegedly infringed**  
 16 **copyrighted material.**

17 Oracle concedes that Dr. Cockburn failed to separate out his patent damages calculation  
 18 on a claim-by-claim basis, Oracle Opp'n at 16, as this Court's July 22, 2011 Order directed him  
 19 to do. July 22, 2011 Order [Dkt. No. 230] at 7. Oracle just argues that this oversight doesn't  
 20 matter. Oracle asserts in its brief that it has limited its trial case to certain asserted claims that  
 21 "are basically representative of the claimed invention, and vary only as to their type." Of course,  
 22 it cites nothing from Dr. Cockburn, any of its technical experts, or even any Oracle employees, to  
 23 support that statement. Oracle has never explained through its experts exactly how the claims it  
 24 plans to try fully represent the patents-in-suit or cover the valuable features disclosed by those

25 <sup>5</sup> Dr. Cockburn begins his calculation of the copyright license, as he did his hypothetical patent  
 26 license, with a \$100 million starting point. But after that his approach to copyright is different.  
 27 In his patent calculation he had first attributed 30% of that total to the patents-in-suit before  
 28 adjusting upward based on the Project Armstrong projection. In his copyright calculation, he  
 does the reverse—first adjusting upward based on the Project Armstrong projection, then  
 attributing 15% of the adjusted total to the copyrights. Purcell Decl. Ex. A (Cockburn Dep.) at  
 246:22-247:17. He never explains why he calculated his copyright license using the same inputs  
 as, but a different order of operation from, the patent license.

1 patents. Dr. Cockburn has never considered the possibility that some of the asserted claims may  
2 be less valuable, or easier to design around, than other claims contained within that same patent.  
3 Indeed, neither he nor Oracle appears to have considered whether this might make a difference to  
4 the value of the hypothetical patent license.

5 Accordingly, because Cockburn has refused to apportion patent value among the asserted  
6 claims in his report, the Court should also preclude him from doing so at trial. Google renews its  
7 request that the Court instruct the jury that, because Oracle has no evidence of the value of  
8 individual patent claims, if the jury finds any asserted claim of any patent invalid or not  
9 infringed, it may assume that the rejected claim represented the full value of that patent, and thus  
10 that Oracle is entitled to no damages for infringement of other claims of that patent.

11 Similarly, the allegedly copyrighted material at issue here includes not only the “structure  
12 and arrangement” of 37 API packages (to the extent that merits copyright protection), but also a  
13 handful of lines of Android code that Oracle contends were literally copied. Oracle asserts that  
14 the APIs are critically important to Android, and Dr. Cockburn’s copyright damages discussion  
15 focuses almost entirely on the APIs. For example, in his reply to Google’s copyright damages  
16 expert, Dr. Cockburn mentions the literally copied code only in one paragraph, Purcell Decl. Ex.  
17 E (Cockburn Reply to Cox) ¶ 21, compared to dozens of mentions of the APIs. Dr. Cockburn  
18 asserts that this doesn’t matter, [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] *Id.* But it is at least possible, if not probable, that portions of Oracle’s  
20 copyright claim will be eliminated before trial, or that the jury will find that Google infringed  
21 some copyrights but not others. If the Court concludes that the “structure and arrangement” of  
22 the API packages is not copyrightable, or the jury concludes Google engaged in fair use of those  
23 packages, Oracle’s copyright claim will be limited to a dozen code files. None of that code was  
24 either inventive or original, most of it was never implemented in Android, and all of it either has  
25 been removed from Android or will be in the next release of the Android software. If the alleged  
26 literal copying were the sole basis of copyright liability, there would be nothing in Dr.  
27 Cockburn’s opinion to assist the jury in calculating copyright damages. The Court’s July 22,  
28 2011 order directed Dr. Cockburn to be specific about how much damages flow from the various

1 elements of Oracle's case, but Dr. Cockburn has never made any attempt to draw any distinction  
 2 for damages purposes among the different categories of copyrighted material at issue here.

3 **E. Cockburn should not be permitted to prejudice the jury by presenting data about**  
 4 **licenses for noncomparable technologies or settlements of noncomparable litigation.**

5 Finally, Oracle fails to address Google's argument explaining why Dr. Cockburn should  
 6 be barred from referring to various licenses involving unrelated technology and parties—most  
 7 obviously, a semiconductor license negotiated between Nokia and Qualcomm. That license  
 8 involves two companies who are not parties and an entirely different technology than the one at  
 9 issue here. Oracle does not dispute that the Federal Circuit generally condemns expert testimony  
 10 about “licenses to technologies *other* than the patent in suit” as part of a reasonable royalty  
 11 analysis. *ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc.*, 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (emphasis in  
 12 original); *see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.*, 580 F.3d 1301, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 13 Oracle doesn't engage with this argument at all. The Court should bar Dr. Cockburn from  
 14 testifying about licenses for technologies other than those allegedly embodied by the patents-in-  
 15 suit, or licenses involving neither Sun nor Google.

16 Instead, Oracle devotes most of its section on other licenses to a screed about the evils of  
 17 so-called fragmentation and the Sun-Microsoft settlement. This argument is premised on the  
 18 same error the Court condemned in its *Daubert* order: it asserts that both this action and the  
 19 Microsoft case involved “the same technology (Java).” But this case is not about “Java.” It is  
 20 about specific, identified functionality in Google's Dalvik virtual machine that allegedly  
 21 infringes Sun patents, and specific API packages and lines of code in Android that allegedly  
 22 infringe Sun copyrights. In any event, Oracle doesn't dispute that the Sun-Microsoft case was  
 23 about more than “fragmentation,” or deny that Cockburn has failed to separate out the values of  
 24 the various components of Sun's settlement with Microsoft. Again, this blasé and broad-brush  
 25 approach shows that Dr. Cockburn and Oracle are less interested in presenting relevant evidence  
 26 to the jury than in causing prejudice to Google by flashing a nine-figure number. The Court  
 27 should exclude any reference at trial to the Sun-Microsoft settlement.

28 ///

**III. CONCLUSION**

This Court should exclude Dr. Cockburn's testimony for all the reasons presented above.

Respectfully submitted,

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